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15 JUL 1963


MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Director
(Colonel Stanley J. Grogan)

SUBJECT : Galley Proofs of "The Craft of Intelligence"
by Allen W. Dulles - Publication Clearance

1. This Office has reviewed the enclosed galley proofs which were forwarded with your memoranda of 20 June 1963 and 1 July 1963.

2. The proofs contain information on operations and techniques which have been mentioned in various periodicals but about which the Agency has never acknowledged by official statements. Mr. Dulles, as past Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, would lend an authenticity to these items which would make future "no comments" very difficult. The following are examples of some of these items.

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4. On page 72 he also denies rumors of a CIA-FBI friction. This is certainly true at the present time but it could lead some enterprising journalist to resurrect the problems of 1947 and 1948 which included the withdrawal of the Bureau agents from South America. Further, this is a statement which is best "unsaid".

5. In Chapter 6, Mr. Dulles discusses technical devices, codes, audio surveillance, taps, mikes, the search for the text of Khrushchev's 1956 speech denouncing Stalin (page 32) (new galley proof, page 32B), and a tip from an Arab student in Arizona which indicated a probable change in his home government. On

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
declassification


of resuming atomic testing in 1961. On pages 48 and 49 (new galley proof, pages 48A and 48B) there is a discussion of counter intelligence and the difficulties of locating illegal radio transmitters and on page 50 (new galley proof pages 50, 50A and 50B) there is a reference to the use of defectors.

6. There are references to most, or all, of the recent Soviet spy cases except the Swedish Colonel. It is not possible for this Office to make a determination as to whether classified information has been included. This determination would have to be made by the CI Staff.

7. In connection with his article, "Studies in Intelligence", Mr. Dulles, in a letter dated 17 January 1963 to Colonel Grogan, advised that the forward contained a statement that the views expressed had not been authorized or approved by the Central Intelligence Agency or by any other Government Agency. On pages 66 and 73 (new galley proofs paragraph 1, page 66B and paragraph 2, page 73A) references are made to the Secrecy Agreement or Oath required by Agency employees. This tends to raise a question or a conflict in the mind of the reader. The probable conclusion of an unbiased reviewer might be (1) Mr. Dulles executed no Secrecy Agreement, (2) he failed to observe his Secrecy Agreement or (3) the information is fictional. For this reason it is believed that the reference to the Secrecy Agreement should be deleted.

8. While each item in itself is not considered to be improper and probably has at one time or another been mentioned in the press, the reporting of these by the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, gives some credence to any speculation along these lines. There are no specific security objections to these individual items, however, a broader question of policy is raised as to whether this is in the best interests of all concerned.

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R. L. Bannerman
Director of Security

Enclosures:

8 July 1963

SUBJECT: Chapter XVI (Security)

(To Mr Dulles)

The following comments are offered in connection with this chapter on "Security":

a. Page 6, last sentence of main paragraph - Suggest the addition of several words so that this sentence would read as follows: "I found the 'lie detector' an important investigative aid in sizing up employees and almost as valuable in clearing people of suspensions and false charges against them as it was in providing clues to weaknesses or derelictions."

b. Pages 6 and 7, the last sentence on page 6 carrying over to page 7 - Suggest that to avoid the implication that the prior Directors did not have a full appreciation of Security, suggest this sentence to read as follows: "The security program got off to a good sound start and was greatly strengthened under that stern but understanding disciplinarian, General Bedell Smith, my predecessor in CIA who worked out the principles of firm and comprehensive security practices."

c. Pages 7 and 8, the last paragraph beginning on page 7 and running into page 8 - Does not account for the part played by the Civil Service Commission which does the bulk of personnel security investigations for those Government departments which do not have investigative staffs of their own. The FBI now handles the Executive Order 10450 cases and forwards its reports to the Civil Service Commission which in turn transmits the report to the department or agency concerned. The FBI also handles some investigations for "Q" clearances; however, the bulk are handled by the Civil Service Commission. The FBI made a conscious effort to get out of the personnel security investigations as the volume of work was tending

to swamp its capabilities which might adversely affect its investigative requirements for other responsibilities. I would suggest this paragraph be written as follows: "In our own Government set-up there is a Security Office in each sensitive Agency which has responsibility for the security of that particular agency. A limited number of these agencies have their own investigative capabilities and their investigative actions become responsive to their interests, investigative needs and problem cases. The other agencies, however, must look to the Civil Service Commission and in limited circumstances to the FBI for assistance in the investigation of prospective employees. In these instances the investigative task is directed to obtaining security information through checks of Government investigative indices and investigations and interviews of associates, neighbors and others who can cast some light on the prospective employee's character. These investigations are factfinding and do not attempt to reach conclusions whether a person should or should not be employed. Final responsibility for personnel security decisions rests with the particular agency during the hiring or firing."

d. Page 9, the sentence beginning on the 10th line - It is suggested here that the comparison with the Soviet system be qualified to better suit the remainder of this paragraph. It is suggested this sentence read as follows: "Here I find that as compared with the Soviet system it would appear that we are rather lax in regards

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desire to maintain continuous control and monitoring over their own personnel, who in many ways they appear to fear more than they do their opposition. This fear is a mixture of lack of confidence in the security of their personnel and here we can cite their frequent splitting of families, keeping some in Soviet Russia and permitting the others to go on overseas assignments and the additional fear that unlimited contact with the Free-World may produce disenchantment with the Soviet system whether or not this disenchantment is encouraged by Free-World penetration or defection efforts.

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Herein lies one of the great weaknesses in the Soviet system which is clearly evidenced by the defections from the Soviet and satellite intelligence and security services. "

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